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This research analyzes the success of the infrastructure 
projects financed by the World Bank, focusing on the 
causal link between the quality of project implementation 
and its outcome. The results show that the success 
of infrastructure projects depends fundamentally 
on the quality of implementation. Although bad 
implementation can harm structurally solid projects, 
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good implementation cannot make structurally weak 
projects successful. This leads to the conclusion that 
governance and selection of well-designed projects are 
essential for success and, in order to improve project 
outcomes, multilateral development banks may need to 
align their incentives toward this objective and invest 
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1 Introduction and Reasons 
Infrastructure  investment  is  a  fundamental  instrument  to  promote  development  and  enhance 
capital  accumulation.  It  reinforces  network  effects  (Roller  and  Waverman    2001),  regional 
comparative advantage (Estache and Fay 1997), education (Brenneman 2002), health (Agenor 
and Moreno-Dodson 2006) and other growth factors. Its importance is out of question, as the 
1994 World Development Report on infrastructure shows (World Bank 1994), and every year 
more than 200 billion dollars are spent on this sector in developing countries, roughly a fifth of 
total investment. 
As well as public authorities, also Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) regard infrastructure 
investment as a priority and promote not only its financing, but also design and regulation. As 
Table 1 reports, the five largest MDBs lend more than USD 50 billion in infrastructure per year, 
with this single sector absorbing between 30 and 70 percent of their total lending.  
However, pouring money is often insufficient to achieve results and, as this work shows, the 
governance  of  projects,  their  selection  and  implementation  are  the  main  factors  on  which 
authorities, both national and international, need to focus. 
For this reason, in this paper we study the performance indicators of infrastructure projects and 
focus on the micro relations involved in them. Through a rigorous empirical analysis, we explain 
which variables are central in getting successful infrastructure projects and what actions can lead 
to high performance. The results of this work are mainly directed to Multilateral Development 
Banks, as we explore how to boost project effectiveness and what can be done toward this aim. 
We  believe  that  this  is  an  important  research  field,  because  in  times  of  high  uncertainty  in 
economic prospects, especially for low-income countries, getting infrastructure investment right 
is central in cutting poverty, sparking growth and consolidating future fiscal positions. 
The  empirical  analysis  relies  on  a  new  database  we  assembled,  which  contains  1912 
infrastructure  projects  financed  by  the  World  Bank  between  1979  and  2008;  these  include 
detailed  project  performance  evaluations  on  which  we  build  this  paper.  Anticipating  on  the 
results, three main insights emerge from this research: 1) the quality of project implementers 
(borrowers) is the most important proxy for project success, regardless of most macroeconomic 
variables; 2) successful project implementation is positively related to the performance of the 3 
 
supervising agent (the World Bank in our case) and 3) successful implementation can create an 
impact  only  in  presence  of  structurally  solid  projects,  therefore  selectivity  and  project 
governance are the tools through which successful infrastructure investment can be achieved.  
Table 1: Infrastructure spending per Multilateral Development Bank in billion dollars
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% of Total 
       
World Bank  58.70  26.41  44.9% 
       
African Development Bank  7.52  3.91  51.9% 
       
Asian Development Bank  11.46  7.51  65.5% 
       
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 
7.72  2.53  32.7% 
       
Inter American Development 
Bank 
13.04  10.0  76.6% 
       
Note:  *  for  the  World  Bank  the  figures refer  to  its 2010  operations,  refer  to  the  Annual  Report  webpage;  for  the  African 
Development Bank the figure refers to its 2009 operations, refer to the Annual 2010 Report, page 18; for the Asian Development 
Bank the figure refers to its 2010 operations, refer to the Annual 2010 Report, page 34; for the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development the figure refers to its 2009 operations, refer to the Annual 2009 Report, page 16-20; for the Inter American 
Development Bank the figure refers to its 2010 operations, refer to the Annual 2010 Report, page 15-25. 
 
These results lead us to suggest that high development performance cannot be achieved unless 
higher investment on project screening and elaboration is pursued. In our opinion, a substantial 
message emerging from this paper states clearly that projects need to be solid and well-designed 
since their proposal, otherwise they do not succeed in terms of development outcome even in 
presence of good implementation. Throughout this paper we will often refer to “selectivity” as a 
key term, with this we intend the selection of projects presenting good design and solid structural 
features. In the empirical analysis we find a clear separation between: ex-ante weak projects, that 
show very low probability of success even in presence of good implementation; and ex-ante 
well-designed  projects,  which  have  a  good  chance  of  succeeding  conditional  on  good 
implementation. Therefore in this work our reference to selectivity does not recall that of David 
Dollar and Victoria Levin (2006), whom defined “selective” in terms of democracy and property 
rights and rule of law.  4 
 
This paper is structured as follows: in the second section we present the empirical strategy, in the 
third  the  data  and  in  the  forth  the  econometric  methods;  in  the  fifth  section  the  results  are 
reported and a number of robustness checks are offered; finally in the sixth section we terminate 
with some concluding remarks. 
2 Empirical Strategy 
Let us imagine to be in “the best of all possible worlds”, in which each project is independently 
and  rigorously  evaluated  given  perfect  information  and  unbiasedness,  so  that  a  certain 
independent agency is in charge of constructing a number of project variables. For example, one 
may report whether a project was successful  (a binary measure), and another variable  “how 
much”  it  was  successful,  rating  in  a  given  ordinal  scale  (a  multiple  measure).  Given  this 
imaginative world, let us also pretend that we dispose of the same variables for the quality of the 
implementer (borrower) and for the agent in charge of supervision and preparation (bank). 
Given these pieces of information, we can try to estimate a simple model, like the following: 
                                            (1) 
in which equation (1) explains project success (    , in which i indexes the country and t the time) 
through a simple linear model, which includes as explanatory variables the quality of borrower 
implementation (      ), some controls (   ) and fixed effects (     ). 
The main objective of this paper lies in estimating the borrower performance impact on project 
outcome, which means estimating in a causal and unbiased way the α coefficient introduced in 
(1). While we introduce controls for several variables, we are aware that there may be some 
project-level  unobservables,  which  may  covariate  with  borrower  performance.  In  order  to 
address this problem, our empirical strategy focuses on the adoption of a two-stage estimation, in 
which for every project we  construct  some instruments,  which are  correlated with  borrower 
performance, without being correlated with project specific unobserved factors. 
For this reason, we present another equation which interacts with (1) 
                                                        (2) 5 
 
in which we explain borrower performance (      ) through bank performance (      ), a set of 
other instruments (   ) and all of the controls and fixed effects introduced in (1). 
We are implicitly assuming a transmission channel which links bank to borrower performance, 
without this variable affecting directly project outcome. Intuitively the channel may be depicted 
as follows: 
Bank Performance → Borrower Performance → Project Outcome 
In  fact  bank  performance  has  an  impact  on  project  outcome  only  if  it  is  able  to  foster  the 
performance of the borrower, for this reason the two-stage methodology may seem the best way 
to estimate the previous equation. 
Why is the variable (      ) appropriate for this estimation? The World Bank is a lending 
institution, which also provides advisory and technical assistance services. It is often referred as 
a “knowledge bank” because offers expertise in most fields involved in the broad “development 
business”: from telecommunication engineers to water specialists, from accountants to lawyers, 
from health to energy experts. However the World Bank does not directly implement projects, 
but  provides  funding  to  external  entities  (national  or  local  governments,  private  or  public 
companies…) which materially work at their realization. For this reason the Bank agrees on the 
initial  project  conditions  and  then  technically  follows  their  implementation,  providing 
supervision and advisory. However, because the Bank does not physically execute the work, its 
performance is likely not to suffer from project-specific characteristics and thus could be a good 
instrument for our analysis. 
However, this variable may not be sufficient in disentangling the unobservables correlated with 
the error term and thus for each project we construct four additional instruments: 
1.  the average borrower and bank performance for the same sector in all countries (except 
i), in this way we rule out country-specific effects interacting with project outcome (the 
variables are referred as borr1 and bank1); 
2.  the  average  borrower  performance  for  all  sectors  (except  the  one  in  analysis)  in  all 
countries  (except  i),  as  this  cuts  off  sector-specific  effects  interacting  with  project 
outcome (borr2 and bank2). 6 
 
This procedure is useful for our purposes and is common in the literature, for example Guasch, 
Laffont and Straub (2006) successfully adopt it.  
3 Data and Literature Review 
In the previous section we had to introduce Leibniz’s fictitious “the best of all possible worlds” 
scenario  to  imagine  that  projects  are  evaluated  independently  and  variables  are  available. 
Actually this procedure is rather standard in several MDBs and at the same World Bank. This 
institution presents a whole department dedicated to evaluating projects and other Bank products: 
the  Independent  Evaluation  Group  (IEG,  formerly  known  as  OED,  Operations  Evaluation 
Department). Its evaluation goals intend to provide an objective assessment of the results of the 
World Bank’s work, through independent and rigorous analysis
2. Though these data may be 
criticized and discussed, we feel that they embody important pieces of information, which may 
lead to useful policy recommendations. 
In this part, we would also like to stress that a few papers have already used IEG data to research 
on  policy-relevant  issues,  though  with  different  research  questions  and  methodologies
3. For 
example Isham, Kaufmann and Pritchett (1997) and Isham and Kaufmann (1999) link a specific 
indicator of project performance
4 with country-level variables, respectively civil liberties and 
sound  macroeconomic  policies.  Other papers  connect  project  performance  to  country-wide 
variables, including institutional quality (Dollar and Levine 2005), conflict (Chauvet et al 2010) 
and volatility (Guillamont and Laajaj 2006). Another line of research, attempts to explain 
project-level data with project-level observations: Deininger, Squire, and Basu (1998) analyze 
the synergies between project success and knowledge/advisory products produced by the World 
Bank
5; Pohl and Mihaljek (1998) analyze the degree of project uncertainty between calculated 
ex-ante and realized ex -post project performances (ERR); while both Dollar and Svensson 
(2000), Kilby (2000) and Chauvet et al (2006) disentangle the impact of project preparation and 
                                                           
2 In Annex B we explain the reasons why we consider these ratings to be realistic, serious, reliable and credible.  
3 We would like to thank Aart Kraay for the exhausting references provided. 
4 They use the Economic Rate of Return (ERR), which is a measure of the estimated (ex-ante ERR) and realized (ex-
post ERR) of economic impact of the project. It is generally defined as the discount rate at which a stream of costs 
and benefits has a net present value of zero. 
5 The expression knowledge products or advisory products refers to the Economic and Sector Works (ESW) and 
Non Lending Technical Assistance (NLTA): these are “background papers” which provide the World Bank project 
staff with analytical and advisory documentation, which may be useful in drafting the project, its aims and its 
implementation. 7 
 
supervision time on a variety of project-level performance indicators. In a very recent paper, by 
analyzing  project-level  variables,  Denizer,  Kaufman  and  Kraay  (2011)  find  out  that  micro 
variables  such  as  project  early-warning  indicators,  supervision  and  evaluation  lags  are  all 
significantly correlated with project outcomes. Another recent work by Fardoust and Flanagan 
(2011) analyzes the relation between project outcome and the impact of the analytical works 
developed by the World Bank. 
Among the documents and data prepared by this department there is the “Historical Record of 
the IEG Project Ratings”, a database of ratings that IEG has been yearly collecting since 1977. 
This contains around 9500 projects for several evaluation variables
6, among which there are the 
ones
7 we are interested in: 
  IEG  Outcome  (from  now  on  Outcome)  -  it  is  defined  as  the  extent  to  which  the 
operation’s major relevant objectives were achieved efficiently.  
  IEG Overall Borrower Performance (Borrower) - it measures the degree to which the 
borrower  (including  the  government  and  implementing  agency  or  agencies)  ensured 
quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, 
toward the achievement of development outcomes.  
  IEG Overall Bank Performance (Bank) – it embodies the level to which services provided 
by  the  Bank  ensured  quality  at  entry  of  the  operation  and  supported  effective 
implementation through appropriate supervision.  
All  of  these  are  rated  with  a  multidimensional  index,  which  takes  into  account  different 
characteristics
8. Each rating results in a six scale measure (which goes from highly unsuccessful 
to highly successful)
9 which may be interpreted for econometric purpo ses as a binary measure 
                                                           
6  Refer to Annex B for a detailed explanation. 




&menuPK=5039271&piPK=64252979   
8 For example, the outcome variable is defined through the following sub-ratings: relevance, efficiency and efficacy, 
which are themselves divided in other ratings; the same is true for Bank performance (composed by quality at entry 
and supervision) and Borrower performance (quality of preparation, implementation, covenants compliance and 
development outcomes). 
9 For the sake of clarity these measures are rated as follows: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately 
Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory. 8 
 
(with 0 embodying the “unsatisfactory variables” and 1 being the “satisfactory variables”)
10  and 
as a 1 to 6 scale (with 1 being Highly Unsatisfactory and 6 Highly Satisfactory) for the multiple 
ratings. 
Given  our  definition  of  infrastructure  project
11,  1912  classify  for  our  analysis.  They  are 
developed between 1979 to 2008 and represent 136 countries;  in Table 2 it is possible to find 
some summary statistics for the whole dataset, while  in Annex A it is possible to find a table 
reporting the countries in analysis and the number of projects per country. However, among this 
dataset, only 1710 projects classify for our analysis and present all of the needed ratings. 
In this work we use both the binary and the 1 -6 ratings. The benefits of the former are several: 
less sophisticated econometric methodologies, more intuitive results and a simpler analytical 
framework. However when the interactions between the performance of the project, borrower 
and  supervising  agent  (bank)   are  to  be  studied,   we  need  to  disentangle  the  marginal 
improvements that performance changes can produce in boosting the project effectiveness ; for 
this reason we employ the 1-6 ratings in order to be as detailed as possible.  
Some authors argued that the project, borrower  and bank 1-6 ratings may be highly correlated 
and that it is uncertain to what extent each rating reports independent information. After having 
read a congruous amount of reports and discussed with evaluators, we feel that this may not be 
the case as  each  indicator is separately developed, argued and strongly motivated by facts, 
interviews and comparisons
12. For what concerns the correlations, it is indisputable that because 
we are dealing with ratings, there will be a significant correlation   and  Table  4  reports the 
                                                           
10 The satisfactory variables take value 1 and are Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory; while 
the unsatisfactory variables take value 0 and are Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory. 
11 We define as infrastructure those projects which are classified in the following sectors: Agriculture and Rural 
Development,  Energy  and  Mining,  Environment,  Global  Information/Communications  Technology,  Transport, 
Urban  Development  and  Water.  We  recognize  that  also  projects  classified  in  excluded  sectors  may  include 
infrastructure  investment  (excluded  sectors  are  Economic  Policy,  Education,  Financial  and  Private  Sector 
Development, Financial Sector, Health Nutrition and Population, Poverty Reduction, Public Sector Governance, 
Social Development and Social Protection), however we needed define infrastructure projects and thus decided to 
take a sector board classification. It may be argued that Agriculture and Rural Development may not be considered a 
fully  “infrastructure  sector”.  We  recognize  that  and  in  our  analysis  we  have  also  repeated  the  same  exercise 
excluding this sector, without any significant recorded change. However because in this specific sector, for example, 
several  projects  deal  with  rural  electrification,  rural  transport,  irrigation,  drains,  embankments  and  other 
infrastructural improvements within rural development, we strongly believe that this sector should be considered 
within a broader definition of infrastructure. 
12 Refer to Annex B for further explanations. 9 
 
correlation  coefficients  between  the  three  variables
13.  However,  the relation between bank, 
borrower and project performance is the core behind this investigation  and as Figure 2 shows 
through  a three-dimensional scatterplot, there is a remarka ble dispersion  and variability  of 
projects ratings between these variables, which encourages this research. 
In addition to  these, we also i ntroduce another available project specific control : the  mean-
normalized size of the project in terms of millio n dollar value
14. In addition to this specific 
control, other  country-wide variables are included as well in (   ): GDP per capita (constant 
2005 international dollars), from the World Development Indicators (World Bank  2010); the 
growth rate of income per capita (World Bank 2010) between the years of the project; a measure 
of volatility, as the standard deviation of GDP per capita (World Bank 2010) during the years of 
the project, in order to catch the relation between a volatile economy and project performance 
(Guillamont and Laajaj 2006); an infrastructure index, based on Calderon, Moral-Benito and 
Serven (2011)
15; drawing from the previous literature, democratic accountability (reported from 
now on as accountability) and government stability (reported  as stability); some variables that 
account for the quality of national administrative institutions , bureaucracy and corruption; last 
but not least  that  ethnic tensions (reported as ethnic) and external conflict (reported as ext. 
conflict) as a solid literature (Easterly and Levine, 1997) proofed their detrimental impact on 
growth.  
These last six institutional variables
16 come from the International Country Risk Guide (Political 
Risk Services 2010), all of them are measu res of risk and are constructed through an inverse 
index: therefore a low measure of “corruption” means a high risk of corruption and viceversa; 
therefore zero is the highest corruption risk, while six is the lowest.  
                                                           
13 To clarify this refer to Figure 1 and Annex B as they provide a project-per-project sense of how the ratings are 
correlated in terms of bank and borrower performance through a rich scatterplot. 
14 We transform the project sizes in constant 2005 international dollars in order to use inter-temporally comparable 
figures. In addition to this we normalize the project size according to a cross-country inter-temporal mean (104.68 
million 2005 PPP dollars). In this way we measure the elasticity of project outcome to relative size, rather than 
dollar value and it should allow an easier interpretation 
15 From Calderon, Moral-Benito and Serven (2011): “We use a principal component procedure to build a synthetic 
index  summarizing  different  dimensions  of  infrastructure.  We  focus  on  three  key  infrastructure  sectors: 
telecommunications,  power  and  road  transport. This  choice  is  consistent  with  previous  literature  on  the  output 
impact  of  infrastructure,  which  has  typically  focused  on  one  of  these  individual  sectors,  most  often 
telecommunications. The synthetic infrastructure index is the first principal component of three variables measuring 
the availability of infrastructure services in these three sectors”.  
16 All of their definitions are available in Annex C. 10 
 
4 Econometric Methods 
We are interested in studying the variable “project outcome”, which is presented as a binary  
measure (0 as unsuccessful and 1 as successful). As a robustness check we also study the 1-6 
outcome  variable  (from  1  highly  unsuccessful  to  6  highly  successful),  because  the  ordinal 
construction of this variable may provide some interesting insights. On the contrary, borrower 
and bank performance are only analyzed as binary variables. There are several reasons behind 
this decision (measurement error, sample heterogeneity…), however the most important is that, 
given the introduced methodological limits, this would not bring any additional information. In 
fact,  it  would  be  meaningless  to  assess  the  impact  of  a  rise  in  the  borrower  performance 
coefficient from 4 (moderately successful) to 5 (successful), because this would probably involve 
a different design of the project and its conditions. For this reason, we only treat borrower and 
bank  performance  as  binary  variables.  According  to  the  adopted  measure  (binary  versus 
multiple),  there  are  differences  in  the  econometric  issues  encountered  and  also  in  terms  of 
coefficient interpretation
17. 
For this reason, as widely done in the literature (ie. Denizer, Kaufman and Kraay 2011), a 
“pragmatic  approach”  is  adopted  in  estimating  this  relation.  We  start  from  the  simplest 
econometric  method  using  binary  variables  and  then  we  enrich  these  estimations  by 
progressively adding one degree of complexity at a time. 
Section 5 presents the results of this work, which are developed in accordance with the following 
scheme: 
1.  First,  the  simplest  estimation  of  equation  (1)  is  implemented  by  adopting  the  linear 
probability  model  and  binary  variables  for  both  project  outcome  and  borrower 
performance.  Though  these  estimates  present  a  number  of  problems,  they  provide  a 
                                                           
17 For example, the OLS model recognizes the existence of ordered data, but violates some of its basic assumption 
(homoschedasticity,  linearity,  normality).  On  the  contrary,  multinomial  models  like  logit  and  probit  would  not 
recognize the dependent variable ordinal context. While so called ordered multinomial models, such as ordered 
probit  or  logit  models  controlling  for  ordinality  and  linearity,  but  present  much  less  intuitive  results  and  their 
interpretation creates  non  negligible problems. First of all, the elasticity estimates are neither to be considered 
typical elasticities (  
     ) nor probabilities (       
     )), but marginal probability effects, mainly informative of 
sign and significance. This means that the computation of the elasticity differs for each independent variable for 
every value of the dependent variable (i.e. the elasticity of the borrower performance for project outcome is different 
if the project outcome is 1, 2 or 6). This may be a positive feature, contributing to disentangle complexity, rather 
than a problem. 11 
 
“rough  sketch”  of  the  probability  that  a  change  in  the  status  of  the  borrower  (from 
unsuccessful to successful) affect the status of the project outcome (from 0 to 1).  
2.   Keeping the same method, we estimate equation (1) by using the multiple measure for 
project outcome and a binary for borrower performance. This coefficient embodies the 
probability that a change in the status of the borrower (from 0 to 1) produces a marginal 
change in project outcome (from 1 to 6). 
3.  Given the previous results, in section 5.2 a number of robustness checks are introduced. 
The first simply repeats the estimation of the previous two steps, by imposing a different 
distribution  of  errors  (logistic  through  logit  and  normal  through  probit);  given  these 
methodologies, both the coefficients and the marginal effects are reported (which in this 
case are not equal, differently the linear probability model). 
4.  Through the second check we introduce multinomial ordered models, which allow both 
for different error distributions (logistic and normal) and to account for the ordinality of 
the project variable. In this estimation the marginal effects are different for every rating 
and produce some interesting, yet controversial, results. 
For  each  step,  we  exclude  and  introduce  country  and  year  fixed  effects  (      ),  without 
significant changes. In these four estimations, in addition to the estimation of (1), we always 
report the two-stage estimations, which includes (2). In order to clarify these steps and provide 
an intuitive understanding of the progressive econometric sophistication of this paper, Table 3 
provides a quick sketch of this section. 
   12 
 
Table 3: Econometric Methods 




Method  Table 
           
5.1  Linear Probability Model   Binary  Binary  OLS/FE  Table 5 
        2SLS  Table 6 
           
5.1  Linear Probability Model   Multiple  Binary  OLS/FE  Table 7 
        2SLS  Table 8 
           
5.2.1  Logit and Probit  Binary  Binary  OLS/FE  Table 9 
        2SLS  Table 10 
           
5.2.1  Ordered Logit and Probit  Multiple  Binary  OLS/FE  Table 11 
        2SLS  Table 12 
Note: the column “Section” refers to the part of next chapter which contains the estimations through the method 
reported in the column “method”. The “Outcome Measure” and “Borrower Measure” columns explain what type of 
rating  is  used,  either  binary  (0  unsuccessful  or  1  successful)  or  multiple  (from  1  very  unsuccessful  to  6  very 
successful), for more references on these measures refer to section 3. OLS means Ordinary Least Squares, FE fixed 
effects method, 2SLS two stage least squares. 
Anticipating on the results we notice that across the estimations there are minor differences and 
the results of 5.1 seem to be pretty robust. The last estimation is more complex, especially for 
what regards its interpretation, for this reason it is more deeply developed in section 5.2.2. 
5 Results 
5.1 The Simplest Estimation 
In this section we report the linear probability estimations of equation (1) and the two equations 
(1) and (2), using binary measures both for outcome and borrower (Table 5 and 6) and a multiple 
measure  for  outcome  and  binary  for  borrower  and  bank  performance  (Table  7  and  8).  An 
intuitive  feature  of  these  estimations  is  given  by  their  coefficients,  which  are  directly 
interpretable  as  marginal  effects  (or  probabilities).  In  general  the  model  seems  to  explain  a 
significant  portion  of  variability  as  the  adjusted  R
2  swings  around  0.5;  while  the  two  stage 
approach seems to be useful as the instruments are always very significant and, though we can 
never validate  them, the overidentification tests (Sargan  and  Basman)  do not  reject  the null 
hypothesis of their validity, both in Table 6 and in Table 8. 
By analyzing tables 5 and 6, we notice that borrower performance is the only significant variable 
across all estimations (including country fixed effects in FE(1) and both country and year fixed 13 
 
effects in FE(2)). Growth is significant only when fixed effects are excluded and the institutional 
variables  (bureaucracy  and  accountability)  become  significant  only  when  fixed  effects  are 
included.  
As  widely  expected  when  borrowers  are  successful  (rating  equals  1)  there  is  a  very  high 
probability, almost 70 percent, that also projects meet their development objective and are rated 
as  successful.  However,  once  in  Table  6  instruments  are  included  in  the  estimation,  this 
probability rises by 50 percent to almost to one. For this reason a negative bias seems to affect 
the estimation of α in Table 5 and the five instruments introduced uncover such bias. This may 
be explained by strategic behaviors implemented by countries in assigning an implementing team 
to a project: countries do not randomly match borrowers (and their quality) to projects; they are 
aware of unobservable factors and according to those each team is matched to a certain set of 
project characteristics. The results of our estimations, in table 5 and 6 but also in the rest of this 
work,  suggests  that  countries  tend  to  assign  “good  implementers”  to  difficult  projects,  as  a 
consequence this may undermine the rating of borrower performance and through the two-step 
approach we uncover this bias. 
Tables  7  and  8  confirm  these  results  once  multiple  ratings  are  introduced  for  the  outcome 
variable. Given the rating of a project, a change in the status of a borrower from unsuccessful (0) 
to successful (1) produces an increase in the rating of roughly 2 points, as Table 7 reports. Also 
in this case, when instruments are introduced α grows by roughly 50 percent a reaches almost 3. 
It  is  important  to  underline  that  in  these,  like  in  all  other  estimations,  the  impact  of  bank 
performance seems to be extremely important in boosting borrower performance. In fact both in 
table 6 and 8, a change in the status of bank performance increases by 70 percent the probability 
of a borrower to become successful. Though exploring this link requires a more careful analysis, 
this fact may represent a stimuli for further research. 
5.2 Robustness Checks 
5.2.1 Introducing Alternative Distributions  
Given our “progressive sophistication approach”, in Tables 9 and 10 we replicate the previous 
estimations by keeping binary measures but assuming a different distribution of errors; therefore 14 
 
logit  and  probit  regressions  are  performed,  introducing  respectively  a  logistic  and  normal 
distribution of error terms. 
The model presents again a relatively high R
2, again around 0.5. The instruments are always very 
significant  and  not  rejected  by  the  overidentification  tests.  For  what  regards  the  estimation 
results, they confirm exactly the previous section in terms of significance. The same marginal 
effects  are  substantially  unchanged.  In  Table  10,  we  notice  that  the  marginal  effects  of  the 
borrower variable, in column Logit(1) and Probit(1), are equal to the coefficients reported in 
Table  5  (~0.68).  Also  the  introduction  of  the  two  stage  procedure  helps  correcting  for  the 
negative bias and the α coefficient confirms the results obtained in Table 6 rising from 0.68 
(columns Logit(1) and Probit(1)) to 0.89 (in column Probit 2SLS (1)). For this reason, once 
again, if a borrower becomes successful there is a 90 percent probability that the project also 
turns successful. 
5.2.2 Multinomial Ordered Models 
With this estimation in addition to alternative distributions, we introduce multiple ratings for 
project  outcome  and  thus  adopt  some  multinomial  ordered  models  (ordered  logit/probit  and 
2SLS ordered probit). Table 11 reports the estimation results, while Table 12 shows the marginal 
effects, which in this case are different for each outcome rating.  Before proceeding with the 
analysis it is important to notice that the results mostly confirm previous estimations: R
2 is lower 
for ordered logit/probit (~0.21- ~0.25) but higher for the two-stage estimation (~0.50). 
The marginal effects in Table 12 report a very interesting and powerful result: when project 
performance is not successful (rating smaller or equal to 4) the impact of a change in borrower 
performance status does not have a positive impact on project performance. In fact, when the 
project outcome variable lies between 1 (very unsuccessful) and 3 (moderately unsuccessful) a 
change in borrower status has a negligible or even negative impact on project performance. On 
the contrary, when projects are moderately successful (4) or successful (5), a change in borrower 
performance can increase the probability of a marginal improvement in project outcome between 
3 and 9 percent, given a rating of 4, or between 57 and 63 percent, given a rating of 5. 
These results  lead to  state that successful  borrower performance can  have an impact  on the 
project, if and only projects are structurally solid and constructed considering how realistic its 15 
 
success can be. In fact, unsuccessful projects (with a rating between 1 and 3) are never going to 
turn successful, even if the borrower performance fulfils the requirements and excels. On the 
other hand, successful projects benefit significantly from improvements in borrower performance 
and thus can reach the highest possible development outcome, conditional on excellent project 
implementation. 
It may be argued that when projects are moderately successful (rating of 4), the change in the 
status of a borrower does produce small or even insignificant effects on project outcome. This 
result may be significantly biased by the fact that a number of these projects (with a rating of 4), 
should have lower rating (3 for example), but are inflated and thus affect the significance of our 
coefficients. 
6 Conclusion 
This work attempts to study the determinants of World Bank project success and disentangle the 
causality  behind  the  relation  between  the  outcome  of  projects  and  the  performance  of  the 
implementer (borrower).  
These results suggest unambiguously that the selection of solid projects, that we call selectivity, 
is  the  fundamental  tool  for  successful  infrastructure  investment:  badly  designed  projects  are 
never going to deliver successful development  outcomes, even if implementers comply with 
quality standards and execute effectively their duty (as Table 12 shows). At the same time, even 
when “good” projects are approved, the World Bank needs to pick up excellent implementers, 
because  its  knowledge  and  financial  support  contribute  to  borrower  performance,  and  thus 
project outcome, only in this case.  
The  fact  that  macroeconomic  and  institutional  variables  do  not  significantly  explain  project 
outcome suggests that broad institutional reforms and good macroeconomic management may be 
useful  for  improving  the  business  climate,  countries’  competitiveness  and  sound  budget 
positions; however in terms of aid and project effectiveness, selectivity is the key and only well-
designed and solid projects combined with high-performing implementers are successful. 
The policy recommendations are very straightforward: the World Bank needs to strengthen its 
capacity building programs and place more and more attention on project governance. With this 16 
 
term  we  mean  the  financing  of  training  and  development  of  countries’  infrastructure 
implementing authorities (public or private companies, ministries, agencies…) and finance well-
designed  and  solid  projects,  conditional  on  the  fact  that  these  authorities  achieved  high 
effectiveness.  
The first problem with this recommendation is that an “equity versus effectiveness” dilemma 
may emerge, because “effective borrowers” may be found in those countries who need the Bank 
support the least. However this needs to be soon demystified: only successful projects deliver 
significant development results, which help fighting poverty and promoting development. For 
this reason such dilemma does not really hold and, in our opinion, the World Bank and other 
development institutions should place attention on effectiveness and results. A serious problem 
which may prevent this strategy from being implemented resides on the incentive structure that 
Multilateral Development Banks, and the World Bank itself, present: providing funding quickly 
in response to countries’ needs may be much more valued than a careful job of project screening 
and elaboration, researching on countries’ true priorities and sectors that unbundle development. 
This may contrast with the “fast lending” desire that the Bank may use as a poor quantitative 
productivity  criterion;  this  pressure  on  lending  speed  may  be  exactly  what  some  corrupted 
officials are keen on, because interested in the lucrative earnings behind loan, rather than its 
development outcome. In our opinion internal reforms which aim to the alignment of incentives 
toward promoting selectivity and developing more project-specific a-priori analysis are key to 
develop successful projects. 
For what regards World Bank performance, it must be stated that we dispose of little evidence 
regarding  its  determinants  and  in  this  research  we  only  preliminarily  studied  it.  From  the 
literature, it seems that some reforms had an impact as they promoted a more adequate team 
composition  and  a  balanced  allocation  of  time  between  project  preparation  and  supervision 
(Denizer, Kaufmann and Kraay, 2011). There is also another interesting channel, which links the 
project ratings with the quality of the knowledge products
18 involved in their project preparation 
(Fardoust and Flanagan, 2011) :  this may be central because as the World  Bank becomes a 
knowledge bank, the  “knowledge intensity” of its projects is due to rise and thus eventually 
promote more performance gains. For all of these reasons, we feel that more data collection 
                                                           
18 Refer to the definition provided in footnote 5. 17 
 
needs to be implemented in order to understand what drives the World Bank performance, how 
Bank performance affects  borrowers and project, and  finally  which reforms  produced a real 
enhancing effect. 
Though external validity warnings are to be made, we believe that the World Bank experience 
may  be  important  for  other  multilateral  development  banks,  international  development 
institutions and, even, national governments. Selectivity is the key and every effort to promote 
development through infrastructure investment need to focus on picking up well-designed and 
solid projects: this may require a huge investment by financing institutions in project elaboration 
and selection, but this seems to be the most important micro step toward the realization of a 
“world free of poverty”. 
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Figure 1: rich scatterplot of Bank and Borrower variables 
Figure 2: 3d scatterplot of Project Outcome, Bank and Borrower Performance 
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TABLE 2: summary statistics 
   
Observations 
 





         
Outcome Multiple  1912  4.127 (1.207)  1  6 
         
Outcome Binary  1912  0.754 (0.430)  0  1 
         
Borrower Multiple  1912  4.140 (1.354)  1  6 
         
Borrower Binary  1912  0.722 (0.447)  0  1 
         
Bank Multiple  1912  4.296 (1.282)  1  6 
         
Bank Binary  1912  0.769 (0.421)  0  1 
         
Size  1912  1 (1.209) [104.088]*  0  8.988 
         
GDP p.c.  1891  4177.30 (3678.40)  351.03  21211.91 
         
Volatility  1866  602.14 (726.80)  0  4948.75 
         
Growth  1872  0.247 (0.314)  -1  2.353 
         
Infrastructure  1891  0.053 (0.063)  0.001  0.321 
         
Bureaucracy  1742  1.944 (0.730)  0  4 
         
Corruption  1742  2.568 (0.739)  0.5  5 
         
Accountability  1742  3.439 (1.333)  0  6 
         
Stability  1742  8.179 (1.607)  2.5  11.5 
         
Ethnic  1742  3.744 (1.202)  0  6 
         
Ext. conflict  1742  9.942 (1.391)  3.5  12 
         
Note: the asterisk indicates value reported in square brackets, which is the mean size of all projects available in our database, 
reported in 2005 constant international dollars.  
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TABLE 4: correlation coefficients for binomial and six scale variables 
Binomial variables 






       
Outcome  1     
       
       
Borrower  0.731  1   
       
       
Bank  0.695  0.658  1 
       
       
 
Six scale variables 






       
Outcome  1     
       
       
Borrower  0.758  1   
       
       
Bank  0.707  0.688  1 
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TABLE 5: regressions on binary ratings of outcome and borrower 
 
 
OLS (1)  FE (1)  FE (2)   
  Binary Outcome  Binary Outcome  Binary Outcome   
Borrower  0.688***  0.687***  0.683***   
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017)   
Size  -0.008  -0.010  -0.009   
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)   
GDP p.c.  0.000005  -0.000006  -0.000001   
  (0.00004)  (0.00004)  (0.00002)   
Volatility  -0.00002  -0.00001  -0.00001   
  (0.00002)  (0.00002)  (0.00002)   
Growth  0.104***  0.075  0.057   
  (0.040)  (0.062)  (0.067)   
Infrastructure  0.139  -0.014  -0.088   
  (0.212)  (0.046)  (0.483)   
Bureaucracy  -0.006  -0.045**  -0.050**   
  (0.011)  (0.023)  (0.023)   
Corruption  -0.002  -0.017  -0.011   
  (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.018)   
Accountability  -0.010*  0.032**  0.027**   
  (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.012)   
Stability  0.001  -0.003  -0.002   
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.012)   
Ethnic  0.005  0.021  0.017   
  (0.006)  (0.016)  (0.017)   
Ext. conflict  0.003  -0.005  -0.007   
  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.009)   
Country FE    Yes  Yes   
Year FE      Yes   
 
Other Statistics 
Observ.  1710  1710  1710   
Adj. R
2  0.545  0.557  0.556   
Prob(F)  0.00  0.00  0.00   
Note: both the project outcome variable and the borrower performance variable are reported on a 0 (unsuccessful) and 1 
(successful) scale. For further references, see the text. 
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TABLE 6: regressions on binary ratings of outcome and borrower  
  2SLS (1)  2SLS (2)  2SLS (3)   
  Outcome  Borrower  Outcome  Borrower  Outcome  Borrower    
Borrower  1.009***    1.027***    1.027***     
  (0.027)    (0.029)    (0.029)     
Size  -0.007  -0.009  -0.007  -0.001  -0.005  0.007   
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)   
GDP p.c.  -0.00001  0.00001  -0.00004  0.00004  -0.00001  0.00001   
  (0.0005)  (0.00005)  (0.0002)  (0.00002)  (0.0002)  (0.00002)   
Volatility  -0.00001  -0.00001  -0.00003  0.00003  -0.00003  0.00004   
  (0.00002)  (0.0002)  (0.00003)  (0.00003)  (0.00003)  (0.00003)   
Growth  -0.002  0.003  0.052  0.035  0.032  0.036   
  (0.052)  (0.059)  (0.087)  (0.086)  (0.093)  (0.095)   
Infrastructure  0.265  0.324  -0.645  0.300  -0.805  0.334   
  (0.266)  (0.279)  (0.614)  (0.648)  (0.639)  (0.657)   
Bureaucracy  0.007  -0.0004  -0.046*  0.005  -0.040  0.005   
  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.025)  (0.032)  (0.026)  (0.033)   
Corruption  -0.010  0.019  -0.020  -0.007  -0.014  -0.004   
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.026)   
Account.  -0.006  -0.010  0.041***  -0.024*  0.039***  -0.026*   
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)   
Stability  -0.013*  0.003  -0.009  0.005  -0.016*  0.002   
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010)   
Ethnic  -0.001  -0.003  0.004  -0.009  0.005  -0.011   
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.024)   
Ext. conflict  -0.005  0.004  -0.016*  0.021**  -0.015  0.018*   
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.011)   
Instruments               
Bank    0.667***(0.02)    0.661***(0.02)    0.661***(0.02)   
Bank 1    3.48***(0.61)    2.53***(0.77)    2.58***(0.79)   
Bank 2    16.3***(2.48)    12.3***(3.30)    12.1*** (3.36)   
Borr 1    -4.49***(0.74)    -3.74*** (1.05)    -3.84*** (1.10)   
Borr 2    -21.9***(3.15)    -19.0*** (4.75)    -18.9*** (4.96)   
               
Country FE      Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   




Observ.  1710  1710  1710  1710  1710  1710   
Adj. R
2  0.436  0.462  0.439  0.470  0.440  0.470   
Prob(F)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   







Basman Test   
Note: both the project outcome variable and the borrower performance variable are reported on a 0 (unsuccessful) and 1 
(successful) scale. For further references, see the text. The number of observations (1709) is lower than the sample because some 
instruments do not present a total coverage of the sample. 24 
 
TABLE 7: regressions on multiple outcome and binary borrower 
 
 
OLS (1)  FE (1)  FE (2)   
  Multiple Outcome  Multiple Outcome  Multiple Outcome   
Borrower  1.915***  1.905***  1.896***   
  (0.096)  (0.047)  (0.048)   
Size  0.012  -0.025  -0.025   
  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.019)   
GDP p.c.  -0.000007  -0.000001  -0.000001   
  (0.00001)  (0.00001)  (0.00001)   
Volatility  0.0001  -0.00005  -0.00005   
  (0.0001)  (0.00002)  (0.00002)   
Growth  0.327*  0.116  0.116   
  (0.113)  (0.179)  (0.179)   
Infrastructure  0.512  -0.000  -0.000   
  (1.173)  (0.475)  (0.475)   
Bureaucracy  0.105  -0.120*  -0.157*   
  (0.077)  (0.065)  (0.068)   
Corruption  0.004  -0.026  -0.026   
  (0.077)  (0.017)  (0.017)   
Accountability  0.034  0.115***  0.108***   
  (0.031)  (0.035)  (0.036)   
Stability  0.027  -0.001  -0.001   
  (0.038)  (0.006)  (0.006)   
Ethnic  0.009  0.015  0.015   
  (0.041)  (0.016)  (0.016)   
Ext. conflict  0.037*  -0.007  -0.007   
  (0.015)  (0.008)  (0.008)   
Country FE    Yes  Yes   
Year FE      Yes   
 
Other Statistics 
Observ.  1710  1710  1710   
Adj. R
2  0.534  0.550  0.552   
Prob(F)  0.00  0.00  0.00   
Note: both the project outcome variable and the borrower performance variable are reported on a 0 (unsuccessful) and 1 
(successful) scale. For further references, see the text. 
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TABLE 8: regressions on multiple outcome and binary borrower 
  2SLS (1)  2SLS (2)  2SLS (3)   
  Outcome  Borrower  Outcome  Borrower  Outcome  Borrower    
Borrower  2.750***    2.755***    2.766***     
  (0.077)    (0.082)    (0.083)     
Size  -0.009  0.028  -0.009  0.028  -0.008  0.028   
  (0.009)  (0.029)  (0.009)  (0.029)  (0.009)  (0.029)   
GDP p.c.  -0.00001  0.00005  -0.00001  0.00005  -0.00001  0.00001   
  (0.00002)  (0.00007)  (0.00002)  (0.00007)  (0.0002)  (0.00007)   
Volatility  -0.00001  0.00005  -0.00001  0.00005  -0.00003  0.00007   
  (0.00003)  (0.0001)  (0.00003)  (0.0001)  (0.00003)  (0.00001)   
Growth  0.119  -0.221  0.015  -0.221  0.116  -0.145   
  (0.124)  (0.265)  (0.196)  (0.265)  (0.095)  (0.285)   
Infrastructure  -0.550  0.863  -0.550  0.863  -0.836  1.113   
  (0.630)  (1.942)  (0.630)  (1.942)  (0.654)  (1.964)   
Bureaucracy  -0.014  0.004  -0.122**  0.004  -0.116  0.003   
  (0.035)  (0.098)  (0.071)  (0.098)  (0.074)  (0.099)   
Corruption  -0.020  0.011  -0.020  0.011  -0.028  0.024   
  (0.018)  (0.075)  (0.018)  (0.075)  (0.026)  (0.077)   
Account.  0.003  -0.001  0.137***  -0.023*  0.148***  -0.026*   
  (0.017)  (0.006)  (0.039)  (0.014)  (0.041)  (0.015)   
Stability  -0.007  0.002  -0.007  0.002  -0.007  0.015   
  (0.009)  (0.031)  (0.009)  (0.031)  (0.010)  (0.031)   
Ethnic  0.010  0.012  0.010  0.012  0.004  -0.003   
  (0.024)  (0.071)  (0.024)  (0.071)  (0.024)  (0.072)   
Ext. conflict  -0.021  0.057*  -0.005  0.021***  -0.004  0.018*   
  (0.017)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.009)  (0.030)  (0.011)   
Instruments               
Bank    0.667***(0.02)    0.661***(0.02)    0.661***(0.02)   
Bank1    3.48***(0.60)    2.53***(0.77)    2.58***(0.79)   
Bank2    16.3***(2.48)    12.3***(3.30)    12.1***(3.36)   
Borr1    -4.49***(0.74)    -3.74***(1.0)    -3.84***(1.0)   
Borr2    -21.9***(3.1)    -19.0***(4.78)    -18.9***(4.96)   
               
Country FE      Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   




Observ.  1710  1710  1710  1710  1710  1710   
Adj. R
2  0.445  0.462  0.461  0.470  0.456  0.470   
Prob(F)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   





Basman Test  0.185   
Note: both the project outcome variable and the borrower performance variable are reported on a 0 (unsuccessful) and 1 
(successful) scale. For further references, see the text. The number of observations (1709) is lower than the sample because some 
instruments do not present a total coverage of the sample. 
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TABLE 9: logit, probit and ivprobit regressions on binomial outcome and borrower 
  Logit (1)  Logit FE (2)  Probit (1)  Probit FE (2)  Probit 2SLS (1)   
  Outcome  Outcome  Outcome  Outcome  Outcome  Borrower   
Borrower  4.079***  4.766***  2.321***  2.653***  4.621***     
  (0.181)  (0.246)  (0.092)  (0.119)  (0.249)     
Size  -0.101  -0.145  -0.051  -0.072  -0.066  0.005   
  (0.074)  (0.093)  (0.038)  (0.049)  (0.082)  (0.010)   
GDP p.c.  -0.00006  -0.00002  -0.00003  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.00002   
  (0.0005)  (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0003)   
Volatility  -0.0003  -0.0001  -0.00001  -0.00003  -0.0003  0.00004   
  (0.0002)  (0.0004)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.00004)   
Growth  1.479***  0.771  0.781***  0.464  1.499  0.009   
  (0.536)  (1.078)  (0.280)  (0.562)  (0.936)  (0.105)   
Infrastructure  1.893  3.231  1.077  1.138  -3.782  0.558   
  (2.907)  (8.501)  (1.501)  (4.545)  (7.132)  (0.796)   
Bureaucracy  -0.085  -0.618**  -0.034  -0.306*  0.153  0.0004   
  (0.135)  (0.309)  (0.071)  (0.159)  (0.269)  (0.035)   
Corruption  -0.030  -0.197  -0.014  -0.102  -0.248  0.0008   
  (0.127)  (0.255)  (0.066)  (0.135)  (0.226)  (0.028)   
Accountability  -0.146**  -0.263  -0.081**  -0.131  0.224*  -0.026*   
  (0.072)  (0.172)  (0.038)  (0.092)  (0.116)  (0.016)   
Stability  -0.016  -0.067  -0.003  -0.036  -0.086  -0.001   
  (0.061)  (0.100)  (0.032)  (0.052)  (0.072)  (0.019)   
Ethnic  0.051  0.240  0.026  0.094  0.095  0.009   
  (0.082)  (0.228)  (0.043)  (0.120)  (0.225)  (0.026)   
Ext. conflict  0.033  -0.122  0.015  -0.063  -0.117  0.019   
  (0.062)  (0.117)  (0.033)  (0.063)  (0.077)  (0.011)   
Instruments               
Bank            0.665***(0.02)   
Bank1            2.61***(0.82)   
Bank2            12.6***(3.51)   
Borr1            -3.88***(1.10)   
Borr2            -19.5***(5.17)   
               
Country FE    Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes   




Observ.  1710  1576








L.Likelihood  -477.50  -396.97  -477.53  -395.97   
Pseudo R





0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   
             
Note: 
– some observations removed because of collinearity between the country and year effects. 
+ALN stands for the Amemiya-
Lee-Newey minimum chi-sq statistic, it is an overidentification test performed on the ivprobit using the two-step estimation 
method. 27 
 
TABLE 10: marginal effects of logit, probit and ivprobit regressions on binomial outcome of borrower 
performance  
  Logit (1)  Logit FE (2)  Probit (1)  Probit FE (2)  Probit 2SLS (1)
+    
  Outcome  Outcome  Outcome  Outcome  Outcome   
Borrower  0.680***  0.741***  0.682***  0.732***  0.897***   
  (0.023)    (0.022)       
Size  -0.010  -0.013  -0.011  -0.014  -0.001   
  (0.007)    (0.008)       
GDP p.c.  0.00006  -0.00002  0.00007  -0.00002  -0.00009   
  (0.0001)    (0.0001)       
Volatility  -0.00003  0.00001  -0.00003  0.00007  -0.00009   
  (0.0003)    (0.0003)       
Growth  0.154*  0.067  0.171***  0.089  0.062   
  (0.055)    (0.061)       
Infrastructure  0.197  0.295  0.236  0.226  0.138   
  (0.302)    (0.329)       
Bureaucracy  -0.008  -0.056**  -0.007  -0.060*  -0.024   
  (0.014)    (0.015)       
Corruption  -0.003  -0.019  -0.003  -0.021  -0.003   
  (0.013)    (0.014)       
Accountability  -0.015**  0.023  -0.018**  0.024  0.028   
  (0.007)    (0.008)       
Stability  -0.001  -0.006  -0.001  -0.006  -0.010   
  (0.007)    (0.007)       
Ethnic  0.005  0.022  0.005  0.019  0.020   
  (0.008)    (0.009)       
Ext. conflict  0.003  -0.011  0.003  -0.012  -0.010   
  (0.006)    (0.007)       
             
Country FE    Yes    Yes  Yes   
Year FE    Yes    Yes  Yes   
Note: 
+ the marginal effects computed for the IV probit come from a numerical procedure, which requests that all specified 
variables and observations be retained in the maximization process. The results from this regression do not significantly change 
from the 2SLS probit, for which however we cannot compute the marginal effects. 
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TABLE 11: ordered logit, probit and 2SLS ordered probit regressions on multiple outcome and binary 
borrower 






Oprobit 2SLS (1)   
  Outcome  Outcome  Outcome  Outcome  Outcome  Borrower   
Borrower  3.904***  4.121***  2.143***  2.727***  2.919***     
  (0.154)  (0.164)  (0.075)  (0.081)  (0.081)     
Size  -0.094  -0.155  -0.051  -0.072  -0.002  0.005   
  (0.076)  (0.095)  (0.038)  (0.049)  (0.027)  (0.010)   
GDP p.c.  -0.00006  -0.00002  -0.00003  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.00002   
  (0.00006)  (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0003)   
Volatility  -0.0003  -0.0001  -0.00001  -0.00003  -0.0003  0.00004   
  (0.0003)  (0.0004)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.00004)   
Growth  0.751***  0.771  0.417***  0.464  1.499  0.009   
  (0.278)  (1.078)  (0.155)  (0.562)  (0.936)  (0.105)   
Infrastructure  1.452  3.231  1.077  1.138  -3.782  0.558   
  (2.907)  (8.501)  (1.501)  (4.545)  (7.132)  (0.796)   
Bureaucracy  -0.085  -0.362**  -0.034  -0.229**  -0.152*  0.0004   
  (0.135)  (0.170)  (0.071)  (0.095)  (0.086)  (0.035)   
Corruption  0.138*  -0.197  0.070  -0.102  -0.248  0.0008   
  (0.072)  (0.255)  (0.040)  (0.135)  (0.226)  (0.028)   
Accountability  0.021  0.235**  0.004  0.152***  0.152***  -0.035   
  (0.038)  (0.092)  (0.038)  (0.051)  (0.048)  (0.046)   
Stability  -0.016  -0.067  -0.003  -0.036  -0.110*  -0.001   
  (0.061)  (0.100)  (0.032)  (0.052)  (0.065)  (0.019)   
Ethnic  0.051  0.240  0.026  0.094  0.095  0.009   
  (0.082)  (0.228)  (0.043)  (0.120)  (0.225)  (0.026)   
Ext. conflict  0.095  0.125  0.047**  -0.063  -0.117  0.012   
  (0.037)  (0.065)  (0.021)  (0.063)  (0.077)  (0.032)   
Instruments               
Bank            2.18*** (0.09)   
Bank1            16.8*** (3.0)   
Bank2            73.4*** (12.6)   
Borr1            -21.8*** (3.84)   
Borr2            -102.8*** (16.4)   
               
Country FE    Yes    Yes  Yes     











L.Likelihood  -1875.52  -1780.69  -1884.79  -1786.43   
Pseudo R




0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   
Note: 
– some observations removed because of collinearity between the country and year effects. 
+ In this estimation the 2SLS 
ordered probit estimaton contains only year fixed effects, because the introduction of country dummies prevents matrix 
convergence to take place. 
# this R




TABLE 12: marginal effects of ordered logit, probit and 2SLS ordered probit regressions on multiple 















  Borrower  Borrower  Borrower  Borrower  Borrower   
Outcome=1  -0.063***  -0.049***  -0.070***  -0.053***  -0.156***   
  (0.010)    (0.015)       
Outcome =2  -0.417***  -0.423***  -0.411***  -0.423***  -0.528***   
  (0.022)    (0.021)       
Outcome =3  -0.194***  -0.214***  -0.166***  -0.187***  -0.141***   
  (0.016)    (0.014)       
Outcome =4  0.033*  0.027*  0.012  0.011  0.093***   
  (0.019)    (0.017)       
Outcome =5  0.581***  0.608***  0.572***  0.602***  0.638***   
  (0.014)    (0.014)       
             
Country FE    Yes    Yes  Yes   
Year FE    Yes    Yes  Yes   
Note: 
+ the marginal effects computed for the IV probit come from a numerical procedure, which requests that all specified 
variables and observations be retained in the maximization process. The results from this regression do not significantly change 
from the 2SLS probit, for which however we cannot compute the marginal effects. 
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Annex A: Countries and projects involved 
Country  Number of 
Projects 
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Annex B: How is the IEG database built? Why are these ratings useful? 
 The evaluations reported in this database are constructed through two methods: ES/EVM and PPAR. The ES/EVM, 
evaluation  summary  or  memoranda,  are  project  evaluations  prepared  and  recorded  by  the  responsible  Bank 
department (not by IEG) at the end of the project (reported in the ICR – Implementation Completion Report). These 
data are then reviewed by the ICR Review board
 (this procedure was established in 1995), which is an intermediate 
World Bank-IEG committee which seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR. The problems behind 
EVM evaluations are linked with the self-assessment produced by projects responsible, which may create an upward 
bias in the data. On the contrary, the Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) offers a much stronger picture 
of the evaluation. These are developed by IEG, which independently and randomly samples 25% of World Bank 
projects  per  year,  sends  its  experts  on  field  to  evaluate  the  results  of  these  projects  and  create  independent 
evaluations 
Though these ratings may not be perfect, we feel that they contain some important pieces of information, which may 
provide useful policy recommendations. One could ask whether these evaluation ratings are realistic? We feel they 
are pretty  much. The department  within the World Bank in charge of their collection, IEG, spends substantial 
resources in reviews and quality controls, employs very experienced evaluators, has very strict confidentiality and 
anti-conflict of interest norms. In addition to this, the institutional architecture of the World Bank structures IEG as a 
special and independent department, which reports only to the Board of Directors (the decision-making entity of the 
World Bank) and not to single departments/vice presidencies, it does not share personnel, resources or initiatives 
with other parts of the Bank; surprisingly enough IEG does not even share the location with other departments and  
is currently placed in a different building. It may also be asked whether these evaluations are taken seriously? Again, 
after  analyzing  internal  reports  and  discussions,  we  feel  they  are.  IEG  creates  a  whole  range  of  products  that 
comment on the evolution of World Bank’s projects and these reports are mostly based on the ES/EVM and PPAR 
data and the project reports behind their construction. Inside the World Bank there is a remarkable attention to the 
evolution  of  the  ratings,  so  far  that  in  1992  after  a  long-lasting  decline  in  project  performance  ratings,  the 
Wapenhans Report (Wapenhans 1992) called for immediate changes in the operational structure of the Bank, as it 
“identified poor project monitoring and supervision, as well as a lack of focus on project outputs and development 
impact, as contributing to poor project portfolio performance” (Sigurdsson and Schweitzer 1995). Another question 
which the nature of this data may spark is whether these evaluations are reliable. This may present two types of 
concern. The first and more general one regards how we define successful a project. It is clearly a micro-definition, 
which heavily depends on the project; in fact its outcome variable measures the “extent to which the operation’s 
major relevant objectives  were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently”
19. Therefore, a project is 
successful if it reaches the stated objectives. This may lead to think that project results may depend on how carefully 
their objectives are stated, for example a project may perform exceptionally well given extremely low goals or 
viceversa. The World Bank addresses this issue substantially in order to avoid such problems, by requiring an 
intense project review process within sectors, questioning whether the project is sufficiently ambitious, feasible and 
meets the poverty-fighting objectives guiding the World Bank mission. In order to attain comparability standards 
several departments are involved in a collective review of each project: the legal Vice Presidency, the procurement 
Vice Presidency, the regional Vice Presidency, the sector manager within the regional Vice Presidency, and for 
complex loans a whole committee, including the Network anchors
20 and other Vice Presidencies. A second concern 
may regard the credibility of these ratings, especially for what concerns the ES/EVM relative to PPAR. In their 
paper Denizer, Kaufman and Kraay (2011) do not find significant differences between the two evaluation type s and 
their dummy capturing this difference is insignificant. In our study, we adopt different variables from their paper, 
still we do not find significant differences. 
   
                                                           




5039271&piPK=64252979   
20 By Network Anchor it is intended the “sectors” in which the Bank’s work is developed, these are: Agriculture and Rural 
Development,  Energy  and  Mining,  Environment,  Global  Information/Communications  Technology,  Transport,  Urban 
Development  and  Water,  Economic  Policy,  Education,  Financial  and Private Sector  Development,  Financial  Sector,  Health 
Nutrition and Population, Poverty Reduction, Public Sector Governance, Social Development and Social Protection. 33 
 
Annex C: The definitions of ICRG variables 
The  definition  of  democratic  accountability  is  reported  from  the  International  Country  Risk  Guide:  “This  is  a 
measure of how responsive government is to its people, on the basis that the less responsive it is, the more likely it is 
that the government will fall, peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly violently in a non-democratic one”. 
The  definition  of  democratic  accountability  is  reported  from  the  International  Country  Risk  Guide:  “This  is  a 
measure of how responsive government is to its people, on the basis that the less responsive it is, the more likely it is 
that the government will fall, peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly violently in a non-democratic one”. 
The  definition  of  government  stability  is  reported  from  the  International  Country  Risk  Guide:    “This  is  an 
assessment both of the government’s ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office. The 
risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum 
score of 0 points. A score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to Very High Risk.” The 
definition of bureaucracy is reported from the International Country Risk Guide: “The institutional strength and 
quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments 
change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern 
without  drastic  changes  in  policy  or  interruptions  in  government  services.  In  these  low-risk  countries,  the 
bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for 
recruitment  and  training.  Countries  that  lack  the  cushioning  effect  of  a  strong  bureaucracy  receive  low  points 
because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative 
functions.”  The  definition  of  corruption  is  reported  from  the  International  Country  Risk  Guide:  “This  is  an 
assessment of corruption within the political system. Such corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several 
reasons: it distorts the economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and business by 
enabling  people  to  assume  positions  of  power  through  patronage  rather  than  ability;  and,  last  but  not  least, 
introduces an inherent instability into the political process”. The definition of ethnic tension is reported from the 
International Country Risk Guide:  “This component is an assessment of the degree of tension within a country 
attributable  to  racial,  nationality,  or  language  divisions.  Lower  ratings  are  given  to  countries  where  racial  and 
nationality tensions are high because opposing groups are intolerant and unwilling to compromise. Higher ratings 
are given to countries where tensions are minimal, even though such differences may still exist”. The definition of 
external  conflict  is  reported from  the  International  Country  Risk  Guide:    “The  external  conflict  measure  is  an 
assessment both of the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, ranging from non-violent external 
pressure (diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions, territorial disputes, sanctions, etc) to violent 
external pressure (cross-border conflicts to all-out  war)”. These risk variables space over a given set, different 
between the variables, i.e. corruption ranges from 0 to 6, government stability from 0 to 12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 